Mission: stop AI answers that fit a stereotype from overriding how common things actually are.
The representativeness heuristic judges probability by how well something matches a mental prototype. Kahneman and Tversky linked it to base rate neglect: people underweight how common a category is when a description seems to fit a type. Their 1973 engineer-lawyer study showed participants leaning on a personality sketch over the known group proportions (overview, lower trust, check the book for the original).
This matters for AI in two ways. The model can produce a stereotyped answer that fits a prototype, and you can accept a judgment about a person or case because the description sounds typical while ignoring how rare the outcome is. Researchers also debate how far these results generalize, so treat the effect as a useful caution, not a law.
Choose the bias the scenario shows.
When an AI judgment depends on how well a case "fits," ask how common the outcome is in the relevant population, and whether the fit information actually predicts it.
Try it this week: pick a prediction the AI made about a person, customer, or risk. Ask it for the base rate, then compare its answer to its first one.